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HUMANITARIAN SUPPLY CHAIN DESIGN FOR SUSTAINABLE 
OPERATIONS: INVESTING IN PREPAREDNESS STAGE OF 
OPERATIONS 
 
 
Ik-Whan G. Kwon, Saint Louis University  
Sung-Ho Kim, Yonsei University, Republic of Korea 
 
 
Between the years of 2000 and 2012, natural disasters caused $1.7 trillion in damage and 
affected 2.9 billion people (dosomething.org). In the Americas (ranked second globally in 
terms of natural disasters) between 2007 and 2016, disasters caused 255,033 deaths, 898,816 
injuries and damages worth $470 billion (Disasters, 2017). In 2016 alone, natural disasters 
caused $175 billion in damage with 8,700 lives (Munich RE, 2017). The above numbers reflect 
only the amount of physical destruction and do not include indirect losses such as 
unemployment, environmental consequences, and business disruptions. Therefore, the full 
impact of these catastrophic events is much greater than these numbers suggest. Response to 
and management of disaster relief supply chain is considered different from that of 
commercial supply chain/logistics in many aspects. This paper argues that investment in the 
preparedness phase is much more effective than spending on the operation side of relief 
efforts. This paper proposes a new humanitarian supply chain design with emphasis on 
investing in an infrastructural phase of humanitarian supply chain.  
 
 
Keywords: Rules of Engagement, Humanitarian Supply Chain, Supply Chain Optimization, 
Impartiality, Neutrality 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Data from EM-DAT (2012), the international disaster database, suggests an alarming 
upwards trend of the number of natural disasters occurring worldwide over the last fifty years. 
From 1965-1975 there were approximately 71 occurrences of natural disasters per year 
worldwide. However, if we take that same ten year span from 1995-2005, we get an average of 
approximately 403 natural disaster occurrences per year. That is a little more than five and a half 
times what it was only twenty years earlier. Eleven percent (11%) of the people in the natural 
disaster areas lives in developing countries, but the disasters occurring in developing countries 
account for 53% of the recorded deaths (Kovacs & Spens, 2011). If damages caused by political 
conflicts (war, terrorist attacks, etc.) are considered, the economic and human suffering would 
exceed far more than information provided above.  
 
Although humanitarian crises happen every year around the globe, it is not an easy task to 
forecast the exact locations, time and magnitude/scale of such disasters making long range relief 
planning and corresponding responses difficult and inefficient at best. Donor’s reluctance in 
investing in humanitarian relief infrastructure coupled with unpredictable occurrences increase 
the relief efforts more than necessary (Heaslip, 2012). It appears that donors are more willing to 
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donate goods and money in response to urgent pleas by international relief agencies on a case by 
case episode. Once such urgency subsidies, donors in many cases withdraw their pledge and in 
some instances, not willing to fulfill their original pledge. One NGO reports that in 2015 only 
53% of pledges were collected ($10.9 billion out of $19.8 billion pledged) (ICVA, 2017). In the 
refuge crises in Darfur, Western Sudan and after hurricane Mitch, for example, aid agencies 
received only a third of the pledged funds (Oloruntoba, 2005). Of pledged, in many instances, 
the amount is too small with the wrong kind of materials that are practically useless in reducing 
human suffering (United Nation Department of Humanitarian Affair, 1993). In some cases, the 
assistance fund met only 10% of the estimated needs (Haavisto, Kovacs, & Spens, 2016). 
Finally, many materials donated are misplaced due to an absence of well-thought out planning or 
lack of logistics personnel. Some experts plead that “we do not need a donor’s conference rather 
we need a logistician conference.” (Shane & Bonner, 2005).  
 
Some experts may argue that humanitarian supply chain/logistics is fundamentally 
different from that of commercial supply chain/logistics, and, therefore operations of these two 
supply chain models produce different outcomes and should not expect the same results. This 
paper, however, will argue that the operational principles are the same and therefore outcomes 
should be same on the different measuring areas (e.g. profits vs. saving lives) (ICVA, 2017).  
 
The purpose of this paper is to outline a comprehensive humanitarian supply 
chain/logistics design employing a commercial supply chain/logistics framework. Emphasis, 
however, will be directed to the preparatory stage of supply chain operations in relief efforts. 
Studies show that a well-prepared infrastructure in prepared stages is much more effective in 
saving lives than investing money and materials in the operational phase of relief effort (Pettit, et 
al., 2011).  
 
This paper is organized as follows; 1. Introduction, 2. Literature review in humanitarian 
supply chain/logistics, 3. Designing humanitarian supply chain, 4 Summary and conclusion, 5. 
Agenda for future study in humanitarian supply chain/logistics. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW IN HUMANITARIAN SUPPLY CHAIN/LOGISTICS 
 
Since it is claimed that the disaster relief effort is about 60 to 80 percent logistics, one 
could speculate that the best way to achieve the goals is through efficient and effective logistics 
operations systems and supply chain management (Van Wassenhove, 2006). Therefore, building 
humanitarian logistics capacity and operational effectiveness has formed a critical foundation of 
global humanitarian relief effort undertaken by the international community. The speed of 
humanitarian aid after a disaster depends on the ability of logisticians to buy, transport and 
receive supplies at the site of humanitarian relief efforts (Thomas, 2005). 
 
Humanitarian logistics in general can be defined as “the process of planning, 
implementing and controlling the efficient, cost-effective flow and storage of goods and 
materials, as well as related information, from the point of origin (sourcing, warehousing and 
distribution centers) to the point of consumption (disaster area) for the purpose of alleviating the 
suffering of vulnerable people. The function, therefore, encompasses a range of activities, 
including preparedness, planning, procurement, packaging, transport, warehousing, tracking and 
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tracing, and custom clearances (Thomas & Kopczak, 2005). Apte (2009) is more specific in 
defining humanitarian logistics in his attempt to bridge the humanitarian logistics to supply chain 
management: humanitarian logistics is that special branch of logistics which manages response 
supply chain of critical supplies and services with challenges such as demand surges, uncertain 
supplies, and critical time window in the face of infrastructure vulnerabilities. 
 
A. Rules of Engagement 
 
Humanitarian supply chain/logistics, unlike commercial supply chain, operates under and 
within four very important and unique set of principles. The humanitarian supply chain should be 
based on; humanity, neutrality, independence and impartiality. Humanity aims at delivering 
assistance without discrimination based on religion, political ideologies, race, and social values. 
Neutrality, on the other hand, refers to the provision of aid without taking sides in a conflict 
caused by political, social, religion or any other reasons. Humanitarian aid is based on 
humanitarian needs only for basic necessities such as food, water, and shelter, clothing and 
medical treatment. As such, there is no room for discrimination based on political ideologies. 
Impartiality implies that action is based on a need base alone. Humanitarian assistance pre-
conditioned based on political and social change should not be tolerated and rejected under this 
principle. Finally, independence mandates a complete separation from political, economic, and 
military intervention when delivering relief items and services. The independence principle 
mandates no military or coercive conditions to be imposed as a condition of receiving 
humanitarian aid (Seipel, 2011). Smith (2007) called these principles the basic rules of 
engagement for NGOs, providing them with a mandate and framework of references under 
which to operate, as well as influencing the degree of cooperation with other personnel in 
governments, military organizations or religious institutes. 
 
B. Three Stages of Operations 
 
Humanitarian relief operations cover three phases of engagement; preparatory stage (Stage 
1), response to urgent needs (Stage 2) and reconstruction (Stage 3) (Kovacs & Spens, 2007, 
italics added). Uncertain funding sources, amount and timing by potential donors make long term 
planning in Stage 1 difficult if not impossible. A sudden influx of goods in response to disasters 
sometimes overwhelms the supply chain operations clogging distribution channels and 
hampering overall relief operations. Furthermore, inappropriate aid materials (e.g. winter 
blankets in Bangkok Flood in 2007) were clogging warehouses and distribution centers 
hampering speedy distribution of critical materials to the needed areas/regions. One United 
Nation report states that “… consistently, many of the internationally supplied relief goods flown 
into countries… prove to be inappropriate and unnecessary… and may even be a barrier to more 
important deliveries.” (United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 1993).  
 
C. Investing in Preparedness Stage (Stage 1) 
 
Adequate funding in Stage 1 is very important and usually determines how quickly and 
efficiently an aid agency can respond to some disaster areas (Jahre & Heigh, 2008). It has been 
shown that a $1 investment in Stage 1 usually creates $3 worth of value in relief operations 
(Stage 2) (Haavisto, Kovacs, & Spens, 2016). Nevertheless, most, if not all, relief responses have 
3
Kwon and Kim: humanitarian supply chain
Published by FHSU Scholars Repository, 2018
98 
 
been focused on and around Stage 2 where the donors’ contributions are greatly exposed to the 
global news media. Once such urgency fades away or political interest is low, aid inflow usually 
either stops or is not honored (Comes & de Walle, 2016; Oloruntoba, 2005; ICVA, 2017). Case 
can be made that sound investment in supply chain infrastructure (Stage 1) will minimize the 
extent of damage and human suffering during relief operations (Stage 2). It is debatable whether 
reconstruction (Stage 3) is within the realm of humanitarian relief supply chain. Humanitarian 
relief effort is a response to onset disaster where capacity of local resources, personnel and 
infrastructure are unable to minimize human suffering. Once such disasters are 
controlled/managed and basic infrastructures are restored, the reconstruction phase should be left 
to the local governments and communities since the requirements for reconstruction is quite 
different from that of responding to relieving on-set disaster (Stage 2).  
 
D. Foundation of Supply Chain 
 
The foundation of supply chain rests upon information sharing. Information sharing 
usually leads to trust among partners who in turn build avenues where collaborative initiative can 
be commenced (Kwon & Suh, 2004 and 2005). Supply chain vision based on a sound foundation 
enables the players to execute supply chain tools more efficiently and effectively to achieve the 
ultimate corporate goals; profit and revenue. Recent research indicates supply chain optimization 
based on a strong collaborative foundation improves overall performance measured by financial 
metrics such as revenue, profit, shareholder’s return (Kwon, Hong, & Hamilton, 2012; Henke, 
Stalkamp, & Yeniyurt, 2014; Partidas, 2015; Kwon, Hong, & Kim, 2017; Saenz, Gupta, & 
Makowski, 2017). A similar argument can be made that humanitarian supply chain built on a 
strong foundation may result in better outcomes in terms of reducing human suffering. 
Commercial supply chain operates under a competitive environment where innovation and 
entrepreneurial spirit guides their journey. The rules of engagement in humanitarian supply 
chain, on the other hand, are bound by four principles that may limit and, in some instance, may 
compromise the relief efforts. 
 
E. Building Relationship 
 
One of the most important areas missing in humanitarian supply chain/logistics is the 
avenue and opportunity where collaborative process can be initiated. 
Under such situation, long term strategic planning is almost impossible in the humanitarian 
supply chain/logistics area. Lack of long term planning tends to deprive opportunities where a 
serious relationship building platform can be initiated between donors and NGOs and NGOs and 
recipients. Nevertheless, coordination, cooperation and collaboration among stakeholders are 
imperative in relief supply chain to realize a maximum benefit out of chaotic situations a. 
 
When circumstance is not tenable for the relationship building process, a “swift trust” 
model is suggested as the second-best alternative (Tatham & Kovacs, 2011). The concept of 
swift trust is based on circumstances where a hastily formed cooperative network (HFN) is 
tentatively formed among players to maximize the relief efforts. HFN has fundamental elements 
that provide a basic platform where initial coordination and cooperation can be formed that may 
ultimately and hopefully lead to collaborative agreements in the long run. Unfortunately, HFN is 
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a short-term concept with no sustainable prospective. Absence of sustainable operations may 
cause redundant processes in each on-set disaster relief theater that wastes scarce resources.  
 
A lack of sustainable dialogue among and between major players (mostly donors and 
NGOs on behalf of recipients of aid) precipitates inefficient and ineffective resource allocations 
in urgently needed areas. Under this circumstance, long term strategic planning is very 
challenging and an attempt to create reasonable/measurable key performance indicators (KPI) is 
almost impossible. Lacks of universally accepted performance indicators in many occasions 
hamper mission success (Heaslip, 2012) and raise doubts by donors as to the effectiveness of 
their investment (donation). Table 1 summarizes some of the differences between commercial 
and relief supply chain management. 
 
Table 1. Similarities and Differences of Main Characteristics between Commercial and Relief 
Supply Chain and Logistics 
 
Attributes Commercial Relief 
Foundation Collaboration Coordination, Cooperation 
Metrics Profitability Saving lives 
Ownership Consumers/Shareholders/ 
Stakeholders 
NGOs/Donors 
Strategies Pro-active Re-active 
Funding sources Retained earnings, Debt, Equity Donation 
Planning horizon Long-term None 
Supply chain models Push-pull Pull 
Approach Pro-active Re-active 
Demand Predictable Unpredictable 
Rules of engagement Competitive environment Humanitarian principles 
 
Metrics for commercial supply chain is corporate’s profitability/revenue while it is how 
many lives are saved and relieved suffering in humanitarian supply chain. In humanitarian relief 
operations, there is no pre-determined target to achieve since on-set disasters occur unpredictably 
without warnings which makes a long-term planning difficult if not impossible. Speed of 
response is often compromised under a degraded logistics infrastructure where roads, ports, and 
air fields are in most cases either destroyed or not in working condition. On top of unusable or 
non-existent logistics infrastructures, communication networks become disrupted making rapid 
deployment of goods and services to the needed areas difficult and in many occasions 
impossible.  
 
Fragmented NGOs deployed at disaster areas with no collaboration among players creates 
a situation where control and command becomes almost impossible causing gluts of needed 
goods in some areas while shortage of critical goods and services in some other areas within the 
same disaster region (Pettit & Beresford, 2005). In addition, since most NGOs are interested in 
responding to urgent needs in a very short time period (Stage 2), donors seldom interested in the 
outcome of their investments. Waste becomes perpetuated as there is no established metrics by 
which the outcomes are measured, compared and evaluated. A lack of steady funding 
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opportunities especially in Stage 1 (preparedness) makes it even harder to optimize the scarce 
resources to maximize the outcome (saving lives) per dollar invested. 
 
Commercial supply chain often uses both forecasting (push model) and market demand 
driven plan (pull model) to optimize their supply chain operations. With data analytics, demand 
based forecasting (pull model) is feasible now than ever in commercial supply chain. However, 
in humanitarian supply chain, forecasting disaster occurrences (push model) is almost impossible. 
React to disasters has been the norm than exception in humanitarian relief history. Accordingly, 
they have to rely exclusively on demand pull response. As a result, it is not uncommon to 
witness gluts in some disaster areas and shortages in other places.  
 
DESIGNING HUMANITARIAN SUPPLY CHAIN 
 
Network design in humanitarian supply chain in general and preparedness stage (Stage 1) 
in particular is a challenging task since future event is unknown and therefore uncontrollable 
(Simchi-Levi, 2010). Risk management principles may guide us with a basic framework for 
network design under extreme uncertain environments. Risk management calls for defining the 
nature of risk, assesses the likelihood, estimates economic/human costs and prepares mitigating 
strategies. In humanitarian supply chain, types of disaster include flood, tsunami, earthquake, 
famine, and other nature induced disasters that result in economic and human suffering. 
Although it is difficult to forecast with reasonable accuracy the likelihood of such disasters 
occurring, records exist indicating prevalence of such occurrence in certain areas/regions more 
than others (e.g. famine in Africa, tsunami in Indian ocean, flood in Southeast Asia and the 
Caribbean region, and earth quacks in Japan, etc.). Monte Carlo model may estimate with 
reasonable accuracy the likelihood of occurrences (Mooney, 1997; Banomyong & Sodapang, 
2012). Mitigating strategies may be followed and in place. 
 
Based on the existing literature, we argue that humanitarian supply chain consists of three 
sequential phase; preparatory phase (Stage 1), operational phase (Stage 2) and reconstruction 
phase (Stage 3). We propose that Stage 1 is further segmented into three parallel stations; 
educational and training station, requirements for within 72 hours disaster station, and 
requirements beyond 72 hours disaster station.  Summary of sequential and parallel roadmap is 
shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2 below. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Humanitarian Supply Chain Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stage 3 
Reconstruction 
Stage 2 
Relief operation 
 
Stage 1 
Preparedness 
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Figure 2. Preparedness Stage 
 
History of disaster recovery shows that the recovery effort would be much more effective 
and successful if humanitarian relief organization invest in the preparedness phase of relief 
operations (Stage 1) (Wakolbinger & Toyasaki, 2011; Petti, et al., 2011). Without firm and well-
thought out planning in Stage 1, recovery efforts may not achieve the maximum goals and 
targets. 
 
Investing in Stage 1 requires three areas of preparation as shown in Figure 2; education 
and training of personnel (Station A), preparing essential items within 72 hours from disaster 
(Station B) and beyond 72 hours (Station C). Disaster areas/regions are unable to handle/manage 
massive international relief aid unless infrastructure is in place ready for receiving, storing, and 
distributing essential goods and services and evacuating and treating the wounded. 
 
Educating and training relief personnel (Station A). In order to prepare and execute 
relief operations, trained professionals should be in place for the task. Foremost, logisticians 
should be trained who can direct efficiently and effectively urgently needed essential goods and 
services to the disaster areas. It should always remind us that 60 to 80% of the total relief fund is 
spent on logistics related areas. Well thought out strategies for recruitment, retention and career 
planning in this area must be developed (Heaslip, 2012). Medical and health professionals should 
be located, recruited and retained for emergency calls. Since the urgent need is to save lives, 
emphasis should be in the areas of emergency medical response at this stage. Along with medical 
and health related personnel, engineers need to be trained and educated for disaster relief 
operations especially in repairing bridges, roads and air fields to transport needed items to the 
disaster areas. Modern communication personnel should be also trained and retained with the 
most advanced portable equipment available. Finally, personnel in the command and control 
field should be adequately trained to maintain safety and security of relief personnel as well as 
people affected by the disaster. 
 
Preparing immediate needs (Station B). Needs for immediate relief become critical 
within 72 hours from the on-set disaster. Infrastructure is destroyed, communication networks 
are disrupted cutting off vital information with the rest of the international communities, 
transportation networks are degraded and unusable, availabilities of basic human needs such as 
Stage 1 
Preparedness 
Station C 
Beyond 72 hours 
Station B 
Within 72 hours 
Station A 
Education and 
Training 
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food, water, medicine, clothing, blankets, etc. either unavailable or destroyed. Banomyong and 
Sodapang (2012) in their supply chain response model proposed a timeline response to relief 
efforts in each activity. According to their simulating model, information flow to trigger 
response should take place within 3 hours, coordinating mechanism within 13 hours, physical 
flow within 22 hours, and clearance activity within 37 hours making total responding time within 
72 hours. Most importantly, a spirit of collaborative formation can be launched at this stage. The 
foundation of any supply chain including humanitarian should be rested upon collaborative spirit 
among the key players. No better place to initiate and engage this process than in Station A 
(Kovacs & Spens, 2007). Success of humanitarian relief efforts depends on a large extent to how 
well each country in general and countries known to be vulnerable to natural disasters in 
particular prepare for potential disasters. Investment into and funding for the preparation stage 
will minimize human suffering during relief operations (Stage 2) and speed up recovery efforts 
(Stage 3). Although no one can predict the types and extent of disasters in the future, literature 
indicates there are a few items essential for survival within a short period of time (usually 72 
hours) and beyond until massive international relief arrives.  
 
Essential items within 72 hours (Station B). According to Schulz and Heigh (2009), the 
Logistics Resources and Mobilization Department (LRMD) of the International Federation of 
Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC) recommend relief items for a maximum of 5,000 families 
within 48 hours and further 15,000 families in 14 days anywhere globally. It includes: 
 
Non-perishable food items (should be sensitive to local customs and culture) (United 
Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 1993) 
Portable drinking water  
Clothing and blankets (should be weather sensitive) (Thomas, 2005)  
 Emergency medical items including hygiene  
Battery operating portable communication equipment  
Tents (weather sensitive) 
Cooking utensils and corresponding fuels 
  
Essential items for beyond 72 hours (Station C). Once immediate needs for survival in 
on-set disaster area are minimally prepared and met, and the situation is stabilized, the relief plan 
at this stage should direct their attention to preparing sustainable operations within Stage 1 until 
outside international aid arrives. The main purpose of operations at Station C is to stabilize the 
infrastructure in the stricken areas to prepare for sustainable relief efforts in Stage 2. Important 
operational concepts at this stage are to prepare for relief effort beyond 72 hours until massive 
international relief aid starts to pour into the affected areas/regions. Some of the items needed for 
this stage of operations may include: 
             
Trained security personnel to protect people and road/bridge/air fields 
Logistics experts to distribute massive supplies to right places at right moments 
Engineers to repair essential roads, bridges and airfields for transfer of urgent relief items 
Secured warehousing and distribution facilities to house incoming supplies 
Translators/Interpreters who coordinate relief effort with international agencies on the  
Ground (Mohman & Jalalzai, 2008)  
Light tractors to clear roads and bridges  
8
Journal of International & Interdisciplinary Business Research, Vol. 5 [2018], Art. 6
https://scholars.fhsu.edu/jiibr/vol5/iss1/6
103 
 
Water purifiers and hygiene dispensers 
Field hospitals (tent) equipped with emergency surgical operations  
Fuel storage tanks 
Others 
 
The categories listed above are more or less in line with the US 10 classifications of relief 
items (Skoglund & Hertz, 2012).  
 
Local sourcing. Another area that needs to be addressed in Station B is a sourcing 
decision. Sourcing for relief management is based on “think global, act local” principle. Local 
sourcing is considered preferable whenever possible as it brings local suppliers into the disaster 
community where local customs, culture, rules and regulations can be easily incorporated into 
sourcing decisions and processes. Products and services in disaster areas become easily adapted 
to their needs. In addition, local sourcing helps the local economy that creates relief capacity 
where further resources can be drawn (Heaslip & Kovacs, 2016). One study claims that in 
disaster relief operations, up to 65 per cent of the costs have been connected to procurement 
(Schultz & Soreide, 2008). 
 
Local sourcing also makes it possible to pool resources to take advantages of economies of 
scale. Attention should be from “a low-volume, high margin” business towards a “high-volume, 
low margin” goods and services under disaster relief sourcing (Ellis, 2011). Finally, local 
sourcing provides a rare opportunity where supplier relationship management (SRM) can be 
initiated that strengthens the supply chain foundation. As discussed earlier, one of the most 
challenging areas in humanitarian supply chain operations is an absence of an avenue where a 
solid foundation can be initiated using collaborative spirits among key players. Hastily Formed 
Networks (HFN) lack the fundamental principle of collaborative framework and is incapable of    
providing value that commercial supply chain would routinely create. Local sourcing may 
provide a basic framework where a trust-based collaborative foundation can be established.  
 
Another advantage of local sourcing is that preparation is based on local culture and 
custom avoiding unwanted and/or unnecessary relief items brought into the relief areas from 
outsiders (U.N. Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 1993). The cultural issue becomes critical 
as both the people affected and the ones helping often come from different backgrounds with 
their respective ways of doing (Sohn, Merilainen and Grant, 2016). Concurrence of these two 
different cultures and customs could cause unwanted conflicts and resentments.   
 
Although local sourcing provides advantages in many aspects of relief supply chain 
operations, it also raises some challenges. If the disasters occur in the same areas/regions where 
local sourcing depends on, immediate responses to the needs may be in jeopardy. The situation 
may be further complicated when and if the international relief agencies are erroneously under 
the impression that essential goods and services are available through local relief sourcing. 
International relief effort may be delayed causing further agony and suffering.   
 
Transportation and warehousing strategies. Designing for ideal distribution centers/ 
warehousing locations is not an easy task since disasters erupt with no advanced warnings. 
However, the sites should be in such areas away from suspected locations such as foothills of 
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mountains and banks of river where flood may overwhelm facilities. In addition to distribution 
facilities in local/regional areas, the floating warehouse concept should be also entertained. 
Floating warehouses similar to Doctors Without Borders business model should be strategically 
located in the areas/vicinities where likelihood of disaster occurrence is high. Floating 
warehouses can and should be used as educational and training facilities as well during the non-
emergency period. Since the concept is “floating”, accessibility to this educational facility is 
economical and effective. 
 
Transportation network using local assets should be mapped, and essential food, water, 
medical items and other basic items should be identified and properly located throughout 
potentially affected areas. Postponement strategy may be initially deployed for some of the 
necessities such as tents, cooking utensils, blankets, etc. until a clear picture emerges as to the 
extent and nature of disasters become known (Heaslip & Kovacs, 2016). Considering the extent 
of initial capital investment in this stage, vendor managed inventory (VMI) strategy should be 
considered to mitigate capital requirement (Christopher & Tatham, 2011).  
 
Military relief involvement. There is some debate whether military rescue operations at 
this stage (Stage 1-B) is appropriate and even desired. Since some countries especially 
underdeveloped countries do not have the capacity to prepare for any potential disaster, military 
involvement seems to be a very attractive alternative. Military can quickly deploy to any disaster 
area worldwide within 48 to 72 hours (Seipel, 2011). In addition, the military has three most 
important assets that civilian relief agencies may not have; command and control, 
communication networks and fleet of transportation. However, military involvement at this stage 
raises a question of the “impartiality” principle in rules of engagement. Potential gains from 
military involvement at this planning stage should be carefully weighed against a possible 
negative effect that may derail the entire relief process.  
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
 
Humanitarian supply chain has not performed well as expected in the past due to a poorly 
understood concept of supply chain foundation. As a result, resources from potential donors have 
been heavily channeled to relief operations on an ad hoc basis. An absence of a well-coordinated 
command and control created the situation where scarce resources have been wasted leaving 
unfinished relief business to local communities. Such a short-sighted practice is not sustainable 
and humanitarian supply chain has been considered as temporary relief logistics tools. 
 
It is time that we re-think relief supply chain from a sustainable prospective. Pouring 
resources into Stage 2 (operations) does not solve fundamental issues. Rather it perpetuates a 
culture of deepening the dependency on foreign interventions. Creating local relief 
infrastructures (Stage 1) is the best way to address the situation (Jahre & Heigh, 2008). It has 
been shown that a $1 investment in Stage 1 often equals to $3 in disaster response (Stage 2) 
(Haavisto, Kovascs & Spens, 2006). Investment in Stage 1 may not be an attractive exposure that 
donors may want. But this process (investing Stage 1) strengthens the foundation for responding 
to the future disasters and encourages the local supply chain community involvement who 
eventually takes process ownership. Local ownership is critical in building sustainable relief 
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infrastructure consistent with local customs and culture (Phillips, 1993; Mohamand & Jalalzai, 
2008).  
 
As Dowty (2011) mentioned, humanitarian aid has failed to reach its potential for relieving 
human suffering because all too often problems are poorly articulated and solutions are imposed 
by donors without regard to the local cultural imperatives of people in need. It is time for 
humanitarian supply chain communities to re-direct their focus from response (Stage 2) to 
preparedness (Stage 1) based on supply chain principles. 
 
AGENDA FOR FUTURE STUDY IN HUMANITARIAN SUPPLY CHAIN/LOGISTICS 
 
Humanitarian supply chain/logistics has performed less than its potentials in spite of huge 
international contributions to the events. Several factors have contributed to such less than 
optimal performance. Absence of unified command and control created opportunities for many 
individual players to act alone in many cases to maximize their own agenda. As a result, shortage 
of certain goods and services in one disaster area while a surplus in other areas. A lack of unified 
coordination creates wasteful results. Misconception that humanitarian supply chain/logistics 
addresses only response to an emergency situation creates imperfect humanitarian relief supply 
chain framework. As a result, waste perpetuates and effectiveness of supply chain operations is 
in many cases compromised. A sound supply chain concept based on collaborative agreement/ 
understanding among and between donors, NGOs and recipients needs to be developed under a 
grand plan of global relief supply chain/logistics strategies. There are currently over 210 relief 
organizations in the world and each has no or limited interaction and coordination with others. 
Duplicative services and materials become inevitable under this situation. 
 
Another area that needs to be addressed is understanding of the importance of the 
preparedness stage in humanitarian supply chain management. Research has shown that return 
on investment in the preparedness stage is higher than investing in the operations stage. 
Nevertheless, most global donors are willing to fund only relief operations. As a result, it takes 
three times more money to provide the same rescue results. A global educational campaign is 
needed to convince the donors of the economics of investing in the preparedness stage of relief 
operations.  
 
Regardless of the investment preferences by the donors, it is imperative to establish a 
humanitarian supply chain network at local levels. The ownership of such initiatives should be in 
local communities supported by international relief organizations. Local ownership is critical to 
improve the relief efforts. The scope of preparedness should be such that sufficient relief 
materials and services are available within 72 hours of disaster. Local sourcing and an 
educational and training system for disaster preparedness also foster the local economy and 
community solidarity in relief efforts. International relief organizations should play important 
roles in establishing local relief networks through education and training support. A close 
coordination between these two groups of relief organizations will lead to a solid supply 
chain/logistics foundation where a collaborative framework can be introduced. Once such 
framework is in place, the efficiency and effectiveness of relief supply chain achieve their 
ultimate goal; relief of human suffering. At which point, sustainable humanitarian supply chain 
becomes reality. 
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FOOTNOTES 
 
a There are some differences in concept between cooperation, coordination and collaboration.  
 Coordination is a process to link each activity without any inherent value (“I do it because I am 
told to do so). No feeling and no vision. Cooperation is a voluntary action by two players to link 
each area of supply chain since the two players see some value for their own company in terms 
of cost, price and profit (“I do it because I see some immediate benefits for me”). Collaboration 
is a process of creating value for the entire players along the supply chain. Price and cost seldom 
enter into this process (“I do it because I see a long-term value for me and for my organization. It 
fosters creating trust and produce “serial equity” as opposed to “spot equity”). (Pekman, 
Kamauff, & Myhr, 1998). 
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